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 We examine liquidity skewness by providing an analysis of bid-
ask spreads for a comprehensive high-frequency dataset 
comprising Eurozone countries’ sovereign bonds. European 
sovereign bond markets exhibited increasing positive skewness 
over the sample period which was most extreme for Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal. We argue that positive skewness reflects 
decreased liquidity during volatile periods. We also report 
negative skewness in 2007.  This can be explained by a feature 
of the limit-order book rubric of the MTS market where market-
makers can submit limit-orders that are more competitive than 
the current best-price to reduce unwanted inventory without 
having to execute a market-order.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper contributes to the sparse literature examining trends in the inter-temporal behavior 
of liquidity, and liquidity skewness, in financial markets.  Specifically, it provides an analysis 
of liquidity and its skewness of the bid-ask spread for high-frequency data from the Mercato 
dei Titoli di Stato (MTS) inter-dealer fixed-income securities platform from July 2005 to 
December 2011. The analysis encompasses seven key eurozone countries including Germany, 
France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Empirically and theoretically many 
studies have addressed equity market liquidity (Hameed et al., 2010; Garleanu and Pedersen, 
2011; Degryse, 1997; Booth et al., 1999; Boehmer, 2005, Swan and Westerholm, 2004; Aitken 
et al., 2006). However, only a few studies specifically investigate liquidity skewness. Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2010) report that bid-ask spreads for US equities have declined, on average, 
and have become increasingly positively skewed. A finding which was consistent across 
exchanges as well as size, price and volume quartiles. They attribute the emergence of positive 
skewness to increased competition among market makers over time. Hsieh, et al. (2018) also 
report that over the period 1996 to 2009 UK equities’ average bid-ask spreads declined and was 
accompanied by increasing positive skewness. They also rely on increased competition among 
market-makers to explain their findings. The aim of this paper is to add to this literature by 
examining liquidity skewness for sovereign bond markets over an important period 
encompassing the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.  
 
In the context of the eurozone, Cheung, de Jong and Rindi (2005) examine every transaction 
for Italian, French, German and Belgian sovereign bonds traded on the MTS platform from 
January 2001 until May 2002. They find that liquidity indicators such as bid-ask spread and 
effective spread are related to the maturity of the instruments. Dunne et al. (2007) study the 
determinants of execution costs and the role of transparency in the European government bond 
market for select months during 2003 to 2005. They find that execution quality is related to 
issuer size, technique and imposed obligations. Darbha and Dufour (2013) analyse liquidity on 
MTS before and during the crisis using data from January 2004 to July 2010. They report that 
liquidity did not provide a significant incremental explanatory contribution to time-series 
dynamics of yields before the crisis, but did become significant during the crisis. Further, they 
find that liquidity played an important role in explaining yield spreads both before and during 
the crisis. Petrella and Resti (2016) perform an empirical analysis of eurozone government 
bonds over the period 2005 to 2012. They find that characteristics such as duration, rating, and 
issue size affect liquidity, and that these variables help identify resilient bonds under stressed 
conditions. More recently, Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio and Uno (2016) investigate the 
relation between credit risk and liquidity for the Italian sovereign bond market during the 
Eurozone crisis and the impact of subsequent European Central Bank (ECB) interventions. 
They report that credit risk influences the liquidity of the market with this relationship 
exhibiting a threshold effect, becoming stronger, when the CDS spread exceeds 500 basis points 
(bp). And that ECB Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) interventions lead to a 
structural break which significantly diminished the intensity of credit-risk liquidity relationship 
from the onset of 2012.  
 
We conduct the analysis on the whole yield curve for each of the seven countries and report 
two main findings. First, similar to equity markets, bond markets exhibited increasing positive 
skewness over the sample period which was most extreme for Greece, Ireland and Portugal.  In 
contrast to the explanation of increased competition for equity markets, we argue that positive 
 bond market skewness result reflects decreased liquidity during volatile periods. Second, we 
report a period of negative skewness in 2007.  This can be explained by a feature of the limit-
order book structure of the MTS market where market makers can submit limit-orders that are 
more competitive than the current best price to reduce unwanted inventory without having to 
execute a market-order and pay the bid-ask spread. By way of a simple stylized example we 
demonstrate how this result can emerge.  The increase in skewness for the European sovereign 
debt market cannot be attributed to increased competition amongst market makers but rather a 
decrease in liquidity, specifically quoted depth, during volatile periods.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
The MTS data covers every transaction for French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese 
and Spanish government bonds being traded on the MTS platform from 1 July 2005 to 31 
December 2011. For each instrument included in the study the limit-order book is available in 
aggregate format with millisecond timestamp. The direction of the trade - buy or sell - is also 
specified. We perform the analysis on all available instruments that were quoted on both MTS 
Domestic Markets and EuroMTS for the entire sample period, using snap-shot observations 
every 15 minutes from 09:00 to 16:30. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
For Germany there were 9 bonds available for the entire period, Spain 7, France 12, Greece 5, 
Ireland 3, Italy 10 and for Portugal there were 4. For each bond there are 49,500 observations, 
which, when multiplied by the number of bonds per country, results in a total number of 
observations for the study of 2,475,000.  Similar to Antonakakis and Vergos (2013) we 
categorise the countries into core and periphery, but also add a third category semi-core 
comprising Italy and Spain in our analysis. Our analysis is conducted over three distinct sub-
periods encompassing a period of pre-crisis calm, the global financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. We have:  
  
• Pre-Crisis Period (PRE): 1st July 2005 to 31st May 2007. 
 
• Global Financial Crisis (GFC): 1st June 2007 to 31st December 2008. 
 
UK stopped lending to each other in July 2007 due to market fears that counterparts 
were exposed to the emerging US sub-prime crisis. Also, in July, Bear Sterns informed 
investors that they would get little, if any, money back from two hedge funds with large 
holdings of sub-prime mortgages. LIBOR rates spike. Following a BBC report on the 
13th September, Northern Rock experienced a bank-run on the 14th. It was subsequently 
nationalised on 22nd February 2008.  
 
• European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC): 1st January 2009 to 31st December 2011. 
 
On 15th January 2009, the Irish government announced that it would nationalize Anglo 
Irish Bank. Fall 2009 Greece’s budget was revised highlighting that the deficit for that 
year would be significantly higher than previously predicted. On May 2nd, 2010 the EU 
endorsed the IMF announce an €85bn first European financial rescue plan for Greece. 
Problems persisted and Greece and a second rescue package was negotiated with Greece 
in 2011. On 28th November 2010 the Trokia (European Commission, European Central 
Bank and International Monetary Fund agreed an €85bn bailout deal with the Irish 
 Government. On 5th May 2011 Portugal agrees with the EU and IMF on a €78bn bailout 
in exchange for an austerity programme.  
 
 
The bid-ask spread is a measure of market quality, defined as the difference between the best 
bid price and best ask price. It gives the difference in price at which the market makers are 
willing to buy and sell the asset. Within each maturity bucket we compare the values over the 
entire period to see how they changed over time. We use snap-shot observations where 
available, every 15 minutes from 09:00 to 16:30. Formally, we define bid-ask spread as follows: 
Bid-ask spread 
1
𝑇𝑇
�((𝐴𝐴1)𝑡𝑡 − (𝐵𝐵1)𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
 (1) 
where A1 is the best ask price and B1 is the best bid price.  
There are a few caveats to be taken into consideration when using the daily bid-ask spread as a 
measure of liquidity. It is sensitive to outliers, especially when liquidity is low, and there are 
not enough quotes on the market to disguise wide spreads. In this section, we give an overview 
of the metrics used in the quote skewness analysis. The analysis is built around the quoted bid-
ask spread, as defined in equation (1). we examine the mean, standard deviation and skewness, 
defined as follows: 
Mean 1
𝑛𝑛
�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (2) 
Standard deviation �
∑(𝑥𝑥 − ?̅?𝑥)2(𝑛𝑛 − 1)  (3) 
Skewness 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛 − 1)(𝑛𝑛 − 2)��𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − ?̅?𝑥𝑠𝑠 �3 (4) 
where 𝑥𝑥 is the quoted bid-ask spread. The mean is the standard arithmetic mean, the standard 
deviation is a measure used to quantify the variation or dispersion of the values, and the 
skewness characterises the degree of asymmetry around the mean. Calculations were performed 
on each bond using snap-shot observations every 15 minutes from 09:00 to 16:30 and aggregate 
at different frequencies as required, detailed in the results section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Liquidity skewness  
Table 2 panel A reports the descriptive statistics for quoted bid-ask spreads, averaged by sub-
periods: calm pre-crisis period, global financial crisis (GFC) and European sovereign debt crisis 
(ESDC), with panel B reporting the same analysis by category: core, semi-core and periphery. 
Figure 1 depicts quarterly quoted mean bid-ask spreads (Panel A) and skewness (Panel B) by 
country.   The bid-ask spread increased in all periods for all countries from the pre-crisis period 
to the GFC, and from the GFC to the ESDC reflecting the decrease in liquidity and increase in 
trading due to successive crises. For example, Germany’s mean bid-ask spread of 0.050 in the 
pre-crisis calm period increased to 0.157 during the GFC which again increased to 0.182 during 
the ESDC. This pattern is repeated for the remaining six countries in panel A. As would be 
 expected Greece, Ireland and Portugal experienced the largest increases in mean bid-ask spread 
during the sovereign debt crisis period with spreads of 2.973, 1.851 and 2.081 respectively.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Bid-ask spread skewness was negative - left-skew - for Germany, Italy, Ireland and Portugal 
over the pre-crisis period and positive for Spain and Greece. Again, we see a similar pattern to 
changes in mean spreads with some variation. Germany’s skewness went from -2.986, to 2.997 
but then decreased to 1,670 during the final sovereign debt crisis period. France, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal experienced increases in skewness over each sub period, while Ireland’s and 
Greece’s skewness peaked during the GFC at 1.955 and 3.075 respectively.  Figure 1 helps 
visualise these findings over time and pin-point specific periods of interest.  It is evident that 
bid-ask spreads began to increase during 2007 and accelerated as the GFC and ESDC deepened, 
with Greece experiencing a spike between Q1 and Q3 2010. It is evident from panel A that 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal were by the end of the sample period experiencing significantly 
high bid-ask spreads relative to the core and semi-core countries.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel B allows us to pinpoint negative spikes in skewness at Q1 2007 which by Q3 2007 is 
mostly positive above the zero line. Overall, skewness was similar across all seven countries 
for the whole period. Initially it was very low, and negative for Germany, Italy, Ireland and 
Portugal, and rose for all countries in 2007 around the first signs of trouble in the financial 
markets; slightly earlier for Greece reflecting the position of increased risk. It decreased 
marginally in 2008 before rising in 2009 and decreasing again through 2010 into 2011. 
Skewness was at a maximum at the beginning of each crisis. A less volatile picture emerges in 
figure 2 confirming this pattern when we plot the same analysis by category: core, semi-core 
and periphery. These figures further highlight the divergence of the mean bid-ask spread across 
the core, semi-core and periphery compared to the similarity of the skewness dynamics. This 
plot shows more clearly that skewness peaked at the beginning of each crisis. To explain our 
empirical findings of negative and increasing inter-temporal skewness we provide two simple 
stylised examples. 
 
4.2. Stylised example 
 
Negative skewness can be explained by a feature of the limit-order book structure of the MTS 
market. In addition to providing firm two-way quotes market makers can submit limit-orders. 
Price takers can only trade by submitting market-orders. Due to market-making activity market- 
makers may obtain unwanted inventory positions that they need to unwind. In calm market 
conditions, when there is low market risk, a market maker can enter a limit-order that is more 
competitive than the current best price with the aim of having it aggressed by a price-taker. In 
this way the market maker would flatten the unwanted inventory position without having to 
execute a market-order and pay the bid-ask spread. Table 4 exemplifies how this situation might 
develop and the impact it has on bid-ask spread skewness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 INSERT TABLES 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The ‘Bid’, ‘Ask’ and ‘Spread’ columns represent the bid quote price, ask quote price and bid-
ask spread from the top of the limit order book. There are six periods representing calm trading.  
Scenario 1 is the control scenario and details a calm market with no quote updates or limit 
orders affecting the top of the book. Scenario 2 is the same in all respects, except in period 4 
where the market maker places a limit-order on the bid side in an attempt flatten a short position 
and avoid paying the full bid-ask spread. Consequently, negative skewness emerges. In our 
simple stylised example skewness decreases from zero in scenario 1 to -2.449 in scenario 2.  
 
Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) conclude that increased competition between market makers, 
and the subsequent reduction of cross-subsidisation across periods of high and low asymmetric 
information, led to larger bid-ask spreads during periods where private information was more 
material and, in turn, an increasing right-skewness in periods of high asymmetric information.  
This argument is based on Glosten and Milgrom (1985) who show that in markets where market 
makers do not have monopoly power they compensate for periods of high asymmetric 
information by increasing the bid-ask spread. The increase in bid-ask spread skewness for the 
European sovereign debt market cannot be attributed to increased competition amongst market 
makers but rather to a decrease in liquidity. Specifically quoted depth during turbulent market 
periods. The average skewness increased over the sample, with spikes appearing at discrete 
points throughout the sample.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 provides another stylised example of how increased skewness can develop when a 
subset of market makers withdraw from the market1. Scenario 1 is the control scenario where 
there are three active market-makers. In period 5 market maker A acquires an unwanted long 
position and so in period 6 significantly decreases his bid price in an attempt to avoid buying 
more. Their obligations require them to quote so they cannot completely withdraw from the 
market. Due to the presence of market-makers B and C this widening of the bid-ask spread by 
market-maker A does not affect the top of the book. Scenario 2 is the same in all respects for 
market-maker A. This time however market- makers B and C are assumed to have withdrawn 
from the market. In this case, the lack of quoted depth has a direct effect on the top of the book 
and, accordingly, increases the bid-ask spread skewness which increases from zero in scenario 
1 to 2.449 in scenario 2. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
 
 
1Pelizzon et al. (2016) show that under conditions of stress a fraction of market-makers 
withdraw from the market. 
 5. Conclusion 
 
In their seminal paper Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) report that bid-ask spreads for US 
equities have declined, while at the same time becoming increasingly right-skewed. An 
outcome which is consistent with increased competition amongst market makers. Hsieh et al. 
(2018) confirm these findings for UK listed equities. This study extends the sparse literature 
examining liquidity skewness to seven eurozone sovereign debt markets from June 2005 to 
December 2011. Our results show an increase in quoted bid-ask spreads for the benchmark 
government bonds for seven representative eurozone countries which was accompanied by an 
increase in right (positive) skewness. Also, while there was significant bid-ask spread 
heterogeneity across country, skewness was largely consistent across all countries and reached 
a maximum at the beginning of both the global financial and European sovereign debt crises. 
We add to the literature by providing an explanation for the increase in skewness in times of 
crisis for the inter-dealer sovereign bond markets in Europe. In contrast to the competition 
amongst market-makers explanation reflecting inter-temporal innovations in equity markets, 
we contend that during crisis periods liquidity is the major factor in bond markets and the lack 
of quoted depth has a direct effect on the top of the book and, accordingly, increases the bid-
ask spread skewness. We also report a period of negative skewness for Germany, Italy, Ireland 
and Portugal in 2007 over a relatively calm pre-crisis market period.  This can be explained by 
a feature of the limit-order book rubric of the MTS market where market-makers can submit 
limit-orders that are more competitive than the current best price to reduce unwanted inventory 
without having to execute a market-order and pay the bid-ask spread.  
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Table 1: Sample  
Country Classification Number of 
bonds 
Observations Per 
Bond 
Observations Per 
Country 
Germany  Core 9 49,500 445,500 
France Core 12 49,500 594,000 
Spain Semi-core 7 49,500 346,500 
Italy Semi-core 10 49,500 495,000 
Ireland Periphery 3 49,500 148,500 
Greece  Periphery 5 49,500 247,000 
Portugal Periphery 4 49,500 198,000 
   Total 2,475,500 
  
  
Table 2 Quoted bid-ask spread statistics 
Panel A: Quoted bid-ask spread statistics, by country   
Ger Fra Ita Spa Gre Ire Por 
   
  
    
Calm Mean 0.050 0.071 0.047 0.063 0.072 0.049 0.043 
 
Std. dev 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.004 
 
Skew -2.986 -0.150 -0.219 0.499 1.531 -0.553 -1.881 
   
  
    
Glob. fin. crisis Mean 0.157 0.298 0.190 0.320 0.493 0.401 0.257 
Std. dev 0.155 0.286 0.183 0.315 0.708 0.533 0.319 
Skew 2.997 1.679 1.841 1.560 3.075 1.955 1.180 
   
  
    
Euro sov. debt crisis Mean 0.182 0.318 0.410 0.604 2.973 1.851 2.081 
Std. dev 0.069 0.193 0.336 0.457 2.964 1.623 2.466 
Skew 1.670 1.717 2.884 1.972 2.078 1.339 1.727 
         
Panel B: Quoted bid-ask spread statistics, by core, semi-core and periphery 
  
Core Semi-core Periphery 
     
Calm Mean 0.060 0.055 0.055 
 
Std. dev 0.008 0.005 0.007 
 
Skew -1.568 0.140 -0.301 
     
Glob. fin. crisis Mean 0.228 0.255 0.384 
Std. dev 0.220 0.249 0.520 
Skew 2.338 1.700 2.070 
     
Euro sov. debt crisis Mean 0.250 0.507 2.302 
Std. dev 0.131 0.397 2.351 
Skew 1.694 2.428 1.715 
     
Notes: The table displays summary statistics for the bid-ask spread calculated from the 
top of the book aggregated across both MTS Domestic Markets and EuroMTS. Snapshot 
observations are taken every 15 minutes from 0900-1630. The mean, standard deviation 
and skewness statistics are first calculated for each bond over the period, then equally 
weighted averages of the resulting individual bond statistics are computed by country. 
  
 Figure 1 
Panel A: Quarterly quoted bid-ask spread mean by country 
 
Panel B: Quarterly quoted bid-ask spread skewness, by country 
 
Notes: These figures display the quarterly mean and skewness for the bid-ask spread by country 
calculated from the top of the book across both MTS Domestic Markets and EuroMTS. 
Germany (DE), Spain (ES), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT) and Portugal 
(PT). 
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 Figure 2   
Panel A: Quarterly quoted bid-ask spread mean, by core, semi-core and periphery 
  
Panel B: Quarterly quoted bid-ask spread skewness, by core, semi-core and periphery 
  
Notes: These figures display the quarterly mean and skewness for the bid-ask spread by core, 
semi-core and periphery calculated from the top of the book across both MTS Domestic 
Markets and EuroMTS. Germany (DE) and France (FR) = Core; Spain (ES) and Italy (IT) = 
Semi-core; Greece (GR), Ireland (IE) and Portugal (PT) = Periphery.  
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Table 3 Example leading to negative skewness 
  
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
  
Bid Ask Spread 
 
Bid Ask Spread 
1 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
2 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
3 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
4 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
 
99.950 100.015 0.065 
5 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
6 
 
99.915 100.015 0.100 
 
99.915 100.015 0.200 
       
Mean 
   
0.100 
   
0.094 
Skewness 
   
0.000 
   
-2.449 
Notes: This table shows an example of a change in bid-ask spread 
skewness in the same market across two scenarios. Scenario 1 is the 
control, and scenario 2 shows how a negative skewness can arise when 
a limit order is placed in an attempt to avoid paying the bid-ask spread 
(period 4). 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 4: Example leading to an increase in skewness 
Panel A: Scenario 1, with the full complement of market makers 
  
Market maker A 
 
Market maker B 
 
Market maker C 
 
Top of the book 
  
Bid Ask 
 
Bid Ask 
 
Bid Ask 
 
Bid Ask Spread 
1 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
2 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
3 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
4 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
5 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
6 
 
98.000 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
              
Mean 
            
0.005 
Skewness 
            
0.000 
 
Panel B: Scenario 2, with a subset of market makers withdrawn from the market 
  
Market maker A 
 
Market maker B 
 
Market maker 
C 
 
Top of the book 
  
Bid Ask 
 
Bid Ask 
 
Bid Ask 
 
Bid Ask Spread 
1 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
- -  - - 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
2 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
3 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
4 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
5 
 
100.010 100.015 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
100.010 100.015 0.005 
6 
 
98.000 100.015 
 
- - 
 
- - 
 
98.000 100.015 2.015 
              
Mean 
            
0.340 
Skewness 
            
2.449 
Notes: This table shows an example of a change in bid-ask spread skewness in the same market 
across two scenarios. Scenario 1 is the control, and scenario 2 shows how a positive skewness can 
arise due to fewer market makers participating in the market. 
 
 
